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APPLICATION OF  
REAL OPTIONS THEORY 
TO DoD SOFTWARE 
ACQUISITIONS
Capt Albert Olagbemiro, USAFR, Johnathan Mun, 
and Man-Tak Shing
The traditional real options valuation methodology, when 
enhanced and properly formulated around a proposed or 
existing software investment employing the spiral develop-
ment approach, provides a framework for guiding software 
acquisition decision making by highlighting the strategic 
importance of managerial flexibility in managing risk and 
balancing a customer’s requirements within cost and schedule 
constraints. This article discusses and describes how an inte-
grated risk management framework, based on real options 
theory, could be used as an effective risk management tool 
to address the issue of requirements uncertainty as it relates 
to software acquisition and guide the software acquisition 
decision-making process.
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Software is currently the major expense in the acquisition of 
software-intensive systems (Figure 1), with its role as a technology 
platform rising from providing a mere 8 percent of weapons systems 
functionality in 1960 to over 80 percent of functionality in 2000 
(Department of Defense [DoD], 2000).
Considering the immense presence and ever-increasing role 
that software plays in weapons systems, software is and should be 
treated as a capital investment; accordingly, an approach empha-
sizing a strategic investment methodology in its acquisition is 
necessary. This approach would emphasize the linking of strategic 
program management decisions to current and future unknown 
software requirements within the stipulated parameters of cost, risk, 
schedule, and functionality. This strategic program management 
approach is needed to align the software investment under consid-
eration within the context of the overall portfolio of existing/planned 
software investments to ensure that synergies in efficiencies are 
leveraged in the delivery of the intended/desired joint capability.
The key to the implementation of a strategic program man-
agement framework is a disciplined requirements engineering 
approach that embodies a risk management-driven model in the 
acquisition planning process. This framework would link and build 
FIGURE 1. SOFTWARE GROWTH IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Note. Adapted from Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software, 
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on two of the three key processes outlined in the 2009 Joint Capa-
bilities Integration and Development System: requirements; the 
acquisition process; and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 
and Execution System.
Method
Risk management should be a consideration that is addressed 
much earlier in the software engineering process—at the acquisi-
tion level—during the investment decision-making activities prior 
to the commitment to acquire and/or develop a software system. 
The appropriate risk mitigation/reduction strategies or options 
should be crafted much earlier in the software investment/acquisi-
tion process, which leads to the real options approach proposed in 
this article.
Real Options Valuation
Real options valuation originated from research performed to 
price financial option contracts in the field of financial derivatives. 
The underlying premise of its suitability and applicability to software 
engineering is based on the recognition that strategic flexibility 
in software acquisition decisions can be valued as a portfolio of 
options or choices in real “assets”—much akin to options on financial 
securities that have real economic value under uncertainty (Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1995). In contrast to financial options, real options valua-
tion centers on real or nonfinancial assets, and is valuable because it 
enables the option holder (the acquisition executive) to take advan-
tage of potential upside benefits while controlling and hedging risks.
An option is a contract that confers upon its holder the right, 
without obligation, to acquire or dispose of a risky asset at a set 
price within a given period of time. When extended to a real asset 
such as software, real options could be used as a decision-making 
tool in a dynamic and uncertain environment. A central and nec-
essary tenet of the real options approach is a requirement for 
the presence of uncertainties—an inherent characteristic of most 
software acquisition efforts. Real options are implicit or explicit 
capabilities created for real assets that provide the option holder 
with time-deferred and flexible choices (options) regarding future 
risks or changes of the software, and could explicitly address the 
When extended to a real asset such as software, 
real options could be used as a decision-making 
tool in a dynamic and uncertain environment. 
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issue of software investment choices for future capabilities. Through 
these capabilities, the option holder may choose to adjust, reduce, 
increase, or abandon the investment in the future, thereby stabiliz-
ing returns from these assets. Prior to its application in any domain, 
the real-options approach calls for the existence of five pre-con-
ditions. These pre-conditions, as outlined by Mun (2006), follow:
1. A basic financial model must be created to evaluate the 
costs and benefits of the underlying software asset.
2. Uncertainties must exist during the software acquisition pro-
cess; otherwise, the real options analysis becomes useless 
as everything is assumed to be certain and known.
3. The uncertainties surrounding the software acquisition 
process must introduce risks, which directly impact the 
decision-making process.
4. Management must have the flexibility or options to make 
mid-course corrections when actively managing the project.
5. Management must be smart enough to execute the real 
options when it becomes optimal to do so.
Since software acquisition encapsulates the activities related 
to procurement decision making, development, implementation, 
and subsequent maintenance, each of these pre-conditions can 
be directly correlated to the various activities associated with a 
software acquisition effort. The uncertainties that surround these 
activities manifest themselves in the form of risks and could range 
from changing or incomplete requirements or insufficient knowl-
edge of the problem domain, to decisions related to the future 
growth, technology maturation, and evolution of the software.
While risks associated with large-scale software acquisition have 
been effectively managed through the application of stochastic 
frameworks and project management techniques, a framework 
based on the real options approach is best suited for the DoD acqui-
sition process because of its capacity to overcome the limitations 
of classical financial analysis techniques, such as the discounted 
cash flow (DCF) or net present value (NPV) approach, both of 
which treat projects/investments as passively managed, rather than 
actively managed projects/investments, albeit a gross misrepresen-
tation of the norm in software acquisition.
Software Acquisition Uncertainties
To tackle the issue of uncertainties surrounding software acqui-
sition, a formal and distinct uncertainty elicitation phase is proposed 
as part of the software investment decision-making process (Fig-
ure 2) to obtain information on the relevant uncertainties from 
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a strategic point of view. Stakeholders in this phase would nor-
mally include representatives of the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council, in concert with independent requirements subject matter 
experts, to identify and document uncertainties as they are revealed 
from an independent point of view.
Implementing an explicit uncertainty elicitation phase would 
facilitate the identification of uncertainties very early on in the 
acquisition process, so the necessary steps could be taken to either 
refine the requirements to address the uncertainties or identify 
strategic options to mitigate the risks posed by the uncertainties.
During the uncertainty elicitation step in the model, uncertainties 
are captured from two perspectives—the managerial and technical 
perspective—as illustrated in Figure 3. Managerial uncertainties of 
people, time, functionality, budget, and resources contribute to both 
estimation and schedule uncertainties, which are considered to be 
pragmatic uncertainties.1 Technical uncertainties—incomplete, ambi-
tious, ambiguous, changing, or unstable requirements—contribute 
to software specification uncertainties, which lead to software 
design and implementation, software validation, and software evo-
lution uncertainties—all of which can be categorized as exhibiting 
both Heisenberg-type2 and Gödel-like3 uncertainties.
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If the uncertainty cannot be resolved, strategic real options 
could be developed to address the risks posed by the uncertainty, 
providing management the flexibility to address the risks posed by 
the uncertainties when they become revealed at a later date during 
the acquisition effort.
The Real Options Valuation Framework
To develop the appropriate options to hedge against the risks 
due to the uncertainties surrounding a software acquisition effort, 
we formulated a generalized real options framework (Figure 4) 
in line with the five preconditions outlined by Mun (2006). This 
proposed framework consists of the following six phases, each of 
which explicitly addresses and establishes compliance with the 
preconditions.
1. Needs Assessment Phase
2. Risk Determination Phase
3. Options Analysis Phase
4. Options Valuation Phase
5. Investment Valuation Phase
6. Execution Phase
88
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We further validated the framework and illustrated its viability, 
as an example, by applying it to the Future Combat Systems Net-
work (FCSN), the software component of the U.S. Army Future 
Combat Systems program (Congressional Budget Office, 2006, 
pp. 2–21)
Results
Phase I: Needs Assessment
Business Case. The needs assessment phase culminates with 
the establishment of a business case along with the associated 
financial model. The financial model is used to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of the underlying software asset being considered 
for acquisition in compliance with the first precondition of the real 
options approach. The traditional discounted cash flow model with 
a net present value4 (NPV) is employed to satisfy this requirement, 
and NPV is computed in terms of five high-level determinants 
(Erdogmus & Vandergraaf, 2004):
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FIGURE 4. REAL OPTIONS FRAMEWORK
 Note. DST = Dempster–Shafer Theory. A mathematical theory of evidence/generalization 
of probability theory where probabilities are assigned to sets as opposed to mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive propositions termed “singletons.” Information from multiple 
sources can be combined in the form of belief assignments, which serves to aggregate 
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NPV = Σ (Ct– Mt  ) – I (1)
(1 + r)
I is the (initial) development cost of the FCSN
t is the (initial) development time or time to deploy the FCSN.
C is the asset value of the FCSN over time t
M is the operation cost of the FCSN over time t
r is the rate at which all future cash flows are to be discounted 
(the discount rate) where the standard assumption in [1] is 
(C –M) is always positive.
An NPV of $6.4 trillion was computed for the FCSN using esti-
mated values of $163.7 billion, 13 years, and 3.0 percent for variables 
I, T, and r respectively based on key assumptions in Olagbemiro 
(2008, pp. 121–148).5 Furthermore, a value of C – M = $10 trillion was 
estimated along the lines of the assumptions by Olagbemiro (2008, 
pp. 121–148).
Uncertainty Identification. Uncertainty identification is the next 
crucial step performed during the needs assessment phase. In this 
step, the uncertainty elicitation model is used as a mechanism to 
identify uncertainties. When applied to the FCSN, it was determined 
that requirements uncertainty fostered by technological maturation 
issues (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2008a, pp. 89–90) 
plagued the FCSN program from the onset and introduced several 
other corresponding uncertainties. Thus, the following uncertainties 
were determined to have been retroactively predictable within the 






1. Estimation uncertainties (size and cost of the software)
2. Scheduling uncertainties
Phase II: Risk Determination
The risk determination phase consists of two steps: uncertainty 
quantification and volatility determination.
Uncertainty Quantification. Uncertainty implies risk; consequently, 
uncertainty must be duly quantified as a risk factor with the goal 
being to assign an appropriate numerical value to the uncertainty. 
This is accomplished by gathering evidence using historical data 
from previous acquisition efforts that faced similar risks. In the 
A Publication of the Defense Acquisition University http://www.dau.mil
91
absence of historical data, the Delphi method6 is suggested. 
The objective of the evidence-gathering activity is to equate/
approximate the software engineering uncertainties of the current 
software acquisition effort to a quantifiable property (risk factor) 
based on historical evidence depicted by previous software 
acquisition efforts. Such evidence-gathering activity is necessary 
to gauge the magnitude/impact of the risk on the underlying asset. 
In our study, while a suitable proxy for the FCSN program was not 
readily available (from a size perspective, FSCN represented the 
largest software investment/development effort to date), data 
obtained from the Joint Strike Fighter7 (JSF) program (JSF software 
component was one-fifth the size of the FCSN program) were 
extrapolated and fitted accordingly to mirror the size of the FCS. 
These data were then utilized as a source of historical information 
for comparative purposes. The risk of requirements changes in 
the FCSN program was estimated to be 12 percent (as opposed to 
1.44 percent for the JSF program, which is one-fifth the size of the 
FCSN program) using the Capers Jones formula shown below (Kulk 
& Verhoef, 2008).8
r = – 1  .100SizeAtEnd
SizeAtStart  (2)
where t is the time period in years during which the estimates were 
observed.
The Capers Jones approach, which is a transposition from 
the financial industry, assumes requirements are compounded 
within a project and asserts that the method of average percent-
age of change of the overall requirements volume lacks information 
because it does not give any information on the time in which the 
change occurred. Determining time is an important, key factor in 
software engineering since requirements changes become more 
expensive to implement the further we are into the software devel-
opment process.
Volatility Determination. Volatility is used to quantify the effect 
of the risk in the form of variations in the returns associated with 
the software investment, and the accuracy of its estimation is a 
key factor in real options valuation because it drives the value of 
an option and is positively related to value. While high volatility 
signifies high risk and implies a higher discount rate and lower 
value in traditional NPV valuation, a high volatility in real options 
analysis is linked to high-option value. This link results from greater 
volatility, which creates a wider range of possible future values of 
the opportunity as the option would only be exercised if the value 
92
Application of Real Options Theory to DoD Software Acquisitions January 2011 
of the opportunity exceeds the exercise price (Hevert, 2007).
Figure 5 depicts identified uncertainties, which were fed into a 
Monte Carlo model—Risk Simulator9 software—taking into account 
interdependencies between both the technical and managerial 
uncertainties associated with the software acquisition effort. The 
software emulated all potential combinations and permutations of 
outcomes (i.e., to determine the effects of requirements volatility of 
12 percent on integration, performance, scheduling, estimation, and 
its overall impact on the software acquisition effort). The analysis 
indicated that requirements volatility introduced an overall volatility 
of 0.0866 percent in the FCSN program. The volatility of 0.0866 
percent resulted in a reduction in the NPV of the FCSN program 
from $6.4 trillion to $6.1 trillion. This reduction in NPV is a result of 
the potential of increased costs in light of the risks facing the FCSN 
FIGURE 5. MODELING SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
UNCERTAINTIES
Note. Adapted from Real Options Analysis: Tools and Techniques for Valuing Strategic 
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program, which ultimately reduces the value of the investment 
effort from a financial point of view.
To improve/refine the accuracy of the volatility estimates, the 
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence (DST)10 is employed to provide 
increased belief, partial belief, ignorance, or conflict with the initial 
estimates (Arnborg & Högskolan, 2006). This is accomplished by 
establishing “belief functions” that reflect the “degrees of belief” 
between the revised NPV estimate, computed at $6.1 trillion in light 
of the risks posed by requirements uncertainty and the FCSN cost 
estimates provided by two independent sources—the Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG) and the Institute of Defense Analyses 
(IDA) (Congressional Budget Office, 2006).
The independent belief functions based on the CAIG and IDA, 
which inferred basic probability assignments associated with each 
of the FCSN risk factors (requirements, integration, estimation risk, 
etc.), were combined using an orthogonal matrix to determine the 
most probable beliefs for the set of risk factors. Where the com-
bined functions reflected “belief” in our estimates, our estimates 
were considered to be valid and were left untouched. In situations 
where the combined belief functions reflected conflict with our 
estimates, our estimates were revised accordingly to reflect the 
estimates computed using the DST approach. Further, we ran the 
Monte Carlo simulation with the revised risk estimates again, thus 
resulting in a “refined” volatility of 0.0947 percent. The derived vola-
tility, which reflects an increase from the initial volatility estimate of 
0.0866 percent, results in a further reduction of NPV in the FCSN 
program from $6.1 trillion to $5.7 trillion. This reduction implies a 
$7 billion shortfall ($6.4 trillion–$5.7 trillion) between the original 
and the refined NPV as a result of the volatility of the software 
investment. Details of the volatility computation can be found in 
Olagbemiro (2008, pp. 121–148).
Phase III: Options Analysis
This phase involves the identification of options. Once the volatil-
ity of the software acquisition effort has been determined, possible 
options could be identified to manage the risks associated with the 
software investment effort (Figure 6). In this study, three broad 




To take advantage of the options identified, the issue of soft-
ware design is revisited. From a software architectural perspective, 
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the decomposition of the software into components, modules, or 
subsystems serves to introduce flexibility from which the program 
manager could exploit and benefit. Since the software design is a 
key activity aimed at conceiving how a software solution would 
solve a particular problem, factoring modular decomposition into 
the design would support the following two propositions (Damo-
daran, 2002, pp. 796–815):
1. Some projects that look attractive on a full-investment basis 
may become even more attractive if the project is parti-
tioned or decomposed into components because we are 
able to reduce downside risk at the lowest possible level.
2. Some projects that are unattractive on a full-investment 
basis may be value-creating if the firm can invest in stages.
A successful modular decomposition would introduce flexibility 
into the acquisition process by recasting the software effort as a 
series of options to start, stop, expand, or defer the development of 
a module or subsystem when requirements uncertainty is encoun-
tered. Note that the FCSN software effort has been decomposed 
into six components: Combat Identification, Battle Command and 
Mission Execution, Network Management System, Small Unmanned 
FIGURE 6. SAMPLE OPTIONS TO ADDRESS SOFTWARE 
INVESTMENTS
Note. Adapted from Real Options Analysis: Tools and Techniques for Valuing Strategic 
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Option to scale up through cost-eective, sequential investments 
as knowledge of the product increases
A flexibility option to switch products, processes, given a shift in 
underlying price of input and output demands
Investment in proprietary assets of one industry enables company 
to enter another industry cost eectively – Link and Leverage
Delay investment until more information or skill is acquired, e.g., 
introduction of new requirements
Shrink or shut down a project partway through if new information 
changes the expected payos, e.g., introduction of new requirements
Limit scope of (or abandon) software project when there is no further
potential in the business opportunity the software is meant to address
Switch to more cost-eective and flexible assets as new information 
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Ground Vehicle, Training Common Component, and System of Sys-
tems Common Operating Environment (GAO, 2008b, pp. 2–31). The 
FCSN software development effort could be recast as a series of 
deferment/learning options and investment/growth options. Such 
options may include start, stop, scale down (e.g., staff), reallocate 
resources, or resume development when uncertainty is resolved; 
or defer development in the face of requirements uncertainty. This 
whole strategy is based on the correct partitioning/decomposition 
of the FCSN into the appropriate systems or subsystems.
To highlight this strategy, we present a scenario.
Scenario: At least one out of the six software components is not facing 
requirements uncertainty. In this scenario, we assume that of the 
six component systems, one is not facing any form of uncertainty, 
while five of the software components are facing uncertainty. We 
proceed to develop different options to address this scenario. For 
our study, we examine two possible options: compound option and 
deferment option.
Compound Option. In the event that at least one of the software 
components is not facing requirements uncertainty, while all the 
others are facing requirements uncertainty, an option could be 
developed to scale down the resources/staff allocated to the soft-
ware components facing requirements uncertainty. The staff could 
then be switched to work on the software component that is not 
facing requirements uncertainty, while the uncertainties in the 
other components are addressed using our uncertainty elicitation 
model. (Note: The assumption with this approach is the software 
component development effort upon which the staff engineers 
are being reallocated to work is not already behind schedule and 
hence does not violate Brooks Law.)11 If the development effort upon 
which the staff are being assigned to work is late (behind schedule), 
the number of staff, experience level, and role that the added staff 
would play in the software development effort must be taken into 
consideration. We therefore framed the real options in this case as: 
an option to contract and scale down from an uncertain system, an 
option to switch resources to another system, and options to expand 
and scale up staff assigned to the development of a system not fac-
ing uncertainty (shown as Strategy A in Figure 7). This is essentially 
a compound option—an option whose “exercise” is contingent on 
the execution of the preceding option.
Deferment Option. In the event that five out of the six software com-
ponents are facing requirements uncertainty, then an option could 
be developed to stop and defer all development, including the 
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development of the software component that is not facing require-
ments uncertainty for a specified period until uncertainty is resolved 
(shown as Strategy B in Figure 7). This is an option to wait and defer.
Phase IV: Options Valuation
Valuation plays a central part in any acquisition analysis. Options 
are usually valued based on the likelihood of the execution of the 
options. Several methods are available for computing and valuing 
real options, such as employing the use of closed-form models, 
partial differential equations, or lattices. For our study, we utilize 
the binomial approach and apply risk-neutral probabilities as this 
method elicits great appeal due to its simplicity, ease of use, and 
the ability to solve all forms of customized real-life options.
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We utilize the Real Options Super Lattice Solver (SLS) 3.0 soft-
ware developed by Real Options Valuation, Inc., for the task. The 
basic inputs are presented in the Table.
Strategy A. The Real Options SLS software was populated 
(Figure 8) based on the following underlying values:
1. Development/Implementation cost of FCSN is $163.7 billion.
2. Value of underlying asset is $6.4 trillion.
3. The risk-free rate is 3.0 percent.
4. Volatility of our project is 0.0947.
5. Duration of software development is 13 years.
6. Lattice steps were set to 300.
TABLE. REAL OPTIONS SUPER LATTICE SOLVER (SLS) 3.0 INPUTS
Symbol
Real Option on Software 
Acquisition Project Description
S Value of Underlying Asset 
(Asset Price)
Current value of expected 
cash flows (expected benefits 
realized from investing in the 
software effort [NPV])
K Exercise Price/Strike Price Price at which the created 
option would be realized 
(investment cost, or cost of 
investing in options, which is an 
estimation of the likely costs of 
accommodating changes)
T Time-to-Expiration The useful life of the option 
(time until the opportunity 
disappears/maturity date of the 
option contract)
r Risk-Free Interest Rate Risk-free interest rate relative to 
budget and schedule (interest 
rate on U.S. Treasury bonds)
cv Volatility Uncertainty of the project 
value and fluctuations in the 
value of the requirements over 
a specified period of time 
(volatility in requirements, 
cost estimation, and schedule 
estimation based on Dempster-
Shafer Theory of Evidence)
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The model was executed, and the lattice of the underlying asset 
(FCSN) (Figure 9) as well as the options valuation lattice for Strat-
egy A (Figure 10), was created. The terminal values in our lattices 
(apex of lattice) are the computed values that occur at maturity, 
while the intermediate values in the lattices are the computations 
that occur at all periods leading up to maturity. All these values are 
computed using backward induction.
The option analysis that represents the value of the option under 
Strategy A returned a value of $6.27 trillion (Figure 10). The options 
valuation lattice of each phase under Strategy A was created and 
values computed using backward induction, working backward 
from Phase III to Phase I to arrive at the results depicted in Figure 10.
Strategy B. In Strategy B, which calls for a “defer and wait” approach, 
an assumption is made that the duration for deferment option would 
be 3 years. We set up our model (Figure 11) using the same assump-
tions used in Strategy A, but set the duration of the deferment 
option to 3 years.
The model is executed and similar to Strategy A; the lattice of 
the underlying asset (Figure 12) is generated. In contrast, the option 
analysis returned a value of $6.25 trillion (Figure 13).
FIGURE 8. SCREEN CAPTURE OF AUTHORS’ MODEL IN THE REAL 
OPTIONS SLS SOFTWARE
Albert Strategy A - Multiple Asset Super Lattice Solver
File Help
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Phase V: Investment Valuation
Given the option value of $6.27 trillion under Strategy A, the 
intrinsic value of the compound option is determined to be $6.27 
trillion – $5.7 trillion = $570 billion. Under Strategy B, the intrinsic 
value of the deferment option is determined to be $6.25 trillion – 
$5.7 trillion = $550 billion. This implies that under both Strategies 
A and B, the program manager should be willing to pay no more 
than (and hopefully less than) the option premium of $570 billion 
and $550 billion respectively. This amount, in addition to the initial 
investment cost of $163.7 billion, should increase the chances of 
receiving the initially projected NPV of $6.4 trillion for the FCSN as 
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opposed to the current $5.7 trillion in light of the risks caused by 
the uncertainties in five of the six software components. This pre-
mium would also include the administrative costs associated with 
exercising an option from an integrated logistics support point of 
view, i.e., costs associated with contractual agreements, software 
development retooling costs, costs associated with infrastructure 
setup of the infrastructure, etc.
In analyzing both strategies, Strategy A is more attractive than 
Strategy B. Instead of waiting for another 3 years at an additional 
cost of up to $550 billion (after which uncertainty would hopefully 
have been resolved) and then proceeding to spend $163.7 billion 
at once to develop all six software components, the staged-phase 
approach in Strategy A calls for budgeting up to $570 billion for the 
option up front. The staged-phase approach also calls for spending 
some $163.7 billion for the System of Systems Common Operat-
ing Environment component, and then investing more over time 
as the requirements are firmed up for the other five components. 
Therefore, under these conditions, Strategy A, which employs the 
compound sequential options, is the optimal approach.
FIGURE 11. OPTIONS SUPER LATTICE SOLVER DEFERMENT 
MODEL
Albert Strategy B - Single Asset Super Lattice Solver
File Help
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Phase VI: Execution
The execution phase deals with the last precondition of real 
options valuation theory, which asserts that decision makers must 
be smart enough to execute the real options when it becomes 
optimal to do so. The options premium has two main components: 
intrinsic value and time value, both of which contribute to the valu-
ation of the underlying software investment. For example, assuming 
that the contract for the FCSN includes an option for Strategy A, 
program managers must then be willing to exercise the compound 
sequential option when they observe that five of the six software 
components are at risk due to uncertainties.
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Discussion
Our proposed approach addresses the risks associated with 
software-related capital investments by taking a proactive approach 
towards risk management by emphasizing the planning for, and 
paying for risk up front. This is not to say that risk management 
strategies are not being adopted today, but rather highlights a 
failure of management to take a strategic approach towards risk 
management. The status quo emphasizes the employment of what 
is deemed to be a “tactical” approach in the form of the spiral 
development process, which results in the elimination/reduction of 
much needed functionality from the scope of the software invest-
ment effort—usually when the acquisition effort is already in the 
development phase. Therefore, the proposed methodology in this 
article would help address some of the limitations of the spiral 
development process by serving as a mechanism through which 
the much desired and needed planning associated with the spiral 
development process is provided.
Conclusions
Uncertainties associated with software-related capital invest-
ments lead to unnecessary and sometimes preventable risks. As 
DoD often sets optimistic requirements for weapons programs 
that require new and unproven technologies, the application of the 
real options valuation methodology would be beneficial as it would 
enable the DoD to incorporate the appropriate strategic options 
into acquisition contracts. The options would serve as a contract 
between the software executive and the contractor (in the case of 
a government acquisition) to buy or sell a specific capability known 
as the options on the underlying project. The real options valuation 
approach is able to overcome the limitations of traditional valuation 
techniques by utilizing the best features of traditional approaches 
and extending their capabilities under the auspices of managerial 
flexibility. Barring the use of an explicit uncertainty elicitation phase 
as proposed in our research, and the development of options to 
hedge against the risk—and ultimately execute the options as they 
appear—we believe the current acquisition process would continue 
to be plagued by the risks of cost and schedule overruns.
The cost-reduction strategy of reducing testing resources pro-
posed by DoD on the JSF program, while risky in itself, still did not 
address the root causes of cost-related increases as identified in 
GAO Report No. 08-569T (GAO, 2008c, pp. 2–17), further under-
scoring the importance of a preemptive and strategic approach of 
identifying uncertainties early on in an acquisition effort and paying 
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for risk up front. By employing our proposed approach, the DoD 
would be able to optimize the value of their strategic investment 
decisions by evaluating several decision paths under certain condi-
tions to lead to the optimal investment strategy.
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ENDNOTES
1. Pragmatic uncertainties are problems in actually performing the development activities.
2. Heisenberg-type uncertainties occur as the system is being developed, grow during 
use, and exhibit themselves in the form of changing requirements due to unsatisfactory 
behavior post-implementation.
3. Gödel-like uncertainties occur when the properties of a program cannot be known from 
the representation because the software systems and their specifications are abstract 
models of the real world.
4. The NPV valuation approach is still utilized because the real options approach “builds” 
on traditional methods such as the NPV by incorporating strategic flexibility in the form 
of “options.”
5. NPV of $6.4 trillion is computed based on: (a) value of the FCSN program (future value 
less operating costs, i.e., sum of [C – M] was $10 trillion; (b) initial development cost I was 
$163.7 billion; (c) r is 3 percent; and (d) time t to develop the FCSN is 13 years.
6. The Delphi method is a subjective estimation methodology based on the elicitation of the 
opinion of an expert or groups of experts to guide decision making by predicting future 
events.
7. At the time of this study, the JSF software acquisition effort represented the largest 
development effort after the FCSN.
8. The requirements volatility of 12 percent was computed based on start and ending SLOC 
(Source Lines of Code) for the FCSN program. SLOC is used for demonstration purposes 
only. A more suitable metric such as function points is recommended.
9. The Risk Simulator software was developed by Johnathan Mun.
10. DST is a mathematical theory of evidence/generalization of probability theory where 
probabilities are assigned to sets as opposed to mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
propositions termed “singletons.” Information from multiple sources can be combined in 
the form of belief assignments, which serves to aggregate the information with respect 
to its constituent parts.
11. Brooks Law states that adding people to a late project makes it later.
